“EPOCH” MORALS FOR GOD This text follows from a set of beliefs that developed, partly in desperation about the human condition---questions of mortality, wrath, superficiality, subjectivity, etc. and the consequent belief that it is relatively God to know God --- that it IS ‘god’ to KNOW ‘god’. This is an attempt at a hierarchy of values that would solve human problems if God implemented them. There is, of course, a hint of folly in this premise, but I don’t mean to acquire all the vindictive acquisitions of meaning everything in a ‘high sense’. High morals, as I believe God has said, are low morals. Low morals are perhaps, high morals. If I express low morals, it is all I can do to express high morals. However, low morals are not the same thing as an absence of morals per se. That is an important distinction. Considered in the absolute, it may seem noteworthy. But it depends on a degree of genius which has not always been possible, or which has been subjectively cloistered ----perhaps almost disastrously ---- just on those people who ‘care’ ---- at a given time ---- at a given epoch. 1. Law is not a flyby, but without serving individuals, there is no potential value. This is a result of an interface corollary, that serving spirit universally may have the end-result of producing narcotic drugs, rather than much more efficiently preventing harm or producing small pleasures in conscious beings. 2. Designing context is the law of design. Law determines what is indefinite. Desire that is indeterminate is the senses. When the law is embodied in a person, the senses are a form of law. What else could be law? For desire is spirit, and pure determinism is pure law, which is material---the mind relies on the senses for its ultimate opinion. Desire is the format of the mind, which is partly sense, and partly undetermined. Part of the law must remain immaterial. 3. Laws may be designed for context, or context may be designed for law. Otherwise, everything is design. In the second sense, context is theory-dependent. In the first sense, determination must be value-laden. 4. Values may be laws, to support the existence of determinations. People become evil when they are reduced to animals. If the law is animals, nature must be a luxury. If nature is too expensive to buy to make it a luxury, people must be elevated above animals, or morality becomes indeterminate. 5. What is determined may be moral when it has value. Value is only selfless when people are selfless. Thus, there may be something wrong with selflessness, and something wrong with selfless values. Generally, the service of the self is the service of consciousness, regardless of illusions, but inclusive of knowledge. 6. Free-will is a form of determinism. Thus, the alternative to good choices is evil in general. Providing for good choices always involves luxuries, although what the luxuries consist of may depend on the context. 7. Functionalism is a so-called potential choice: potential in the form of a choice. People are moral in the sense that they take good opportunities when they know them to be good. The only limitation upon paradise is knowledge, which can be understood to mean that the only limitation upon human nature is knowledge, that is, if human nature is a function of desire, as it would be if humans received what they wish. That is, another limitation may be determinism. As humans understand it, however, determinism does not allow moral choices. 8. Paradise is functionalism. Although avoiding this is tempting, paradise is a strong paradigm for human functionalism. Psychology supports the idea that original beliefs dwell in the garden. And evolutionary theory has it that life is derived from it---however pessimistically. Nathan Coppedge, SCSU 12/06/2014, p.