ۣۢۨٷۻۢٷۛۦۍڷ۠ٷۣۢۨٷۢۦۙۨۢٲ
ۍІٲۛҖۦۣۘۛۙғۦۖۡٷۗ۠ۧғٷۢۦ۩ۣ۞ҖҖۃۤۨۨۜ
ẹếẰẽẹẬếẴẺẹẬặڷۦۣۚڷ۪ۧۙۗۦۙۧڷ۠ٷۣۢۨۘۘۆ
ẽẲẬẹẴễẬếẴẺẹ
ۙۦۙۜڷ۟ۗ۠Өڷۃۧۨۦۙ۠ٷڷ۠ٷۡٮ
ۙۦۙۜڷ۟ۗ۠Өڷۃۣۧۢۨۤۦۗۧۖ۩ۑ
ۙۦۙۜڷ۟ۗ۠Өڷۃۧۨۢۦۤۙۦڷ۠ٷۗۦۣۙۡۡӨ
ۙۦۙۜڷ۟ۗ۠Өڷۃڷۙۧ۩ڷۣۚڷۧۡۦۙے
ۘۢٷڷۧۨۗںۙөڷۤۜۧۦۙۘٷۙۋڷۃۡۧۦۣۦۦۙےڷۛۢۢٷ۠ۤٮ
ۧۗۨۗٷےڷۤ۩ۣۦٰڷۨۢٷۨ۠ی
ۦۣۙۨۨێڷғۊψғڷۤ۠ۜێڷۘۢٷڷۧۡۜٷۦۖۆڷٷی
ھۀڿڷҒڷڽڽڿڷۤۤڷۃҢڽڼھڷۜۗۦٷیڷҖڷھڼڷۙ۩ۧۧٲڷҖڷۂڿڷۙۡ۩ۣ۠۔ڷҖڷۣۢۨٷۻۢٷۛۦۍڷ۠ٷۣۢۨٷۢۦۙۨۢٲ
Ңڽڼھڷۜۗۦٷیڷڿڽڷۃۣۙۢ۠ۢڷۘۙۜۧ۠ۖ۩ێڷۃڽڽۀڼڼڼۀڽڿہڽہڼھڼڼۑҖۀڽڼڽғڼڽڷۃٲۍө
ڽڽۀڼڼڼۀڽڿہڽہڼھڼڼۑٵۨۗٷۦۨۧۖٷۛҖۦۣۘۛۙғۦۖۡٷۗ۠ۧғٷۢۦ۩ۣ۞ҖҖۃۤۨۨۜڷۃۙ۠ۗۨۦٷڷۧۜۨڷۣۨڷ۟ۢۋ
ۃۙ۠ۗۨۦٷڷۧۜۨڷۙۨۗڷۣۨڷۣ۫ٱ
ۤۜۧۦۙۘٷۙۋڷۃۡۧۦۣۦۦۙےڷۛۢۢٷ۠ۤٮڷғۀҢڽڼھڿڷۦۣۙۨۨێڷғۊψғڷۤ۠ۜێڷۘۢٷڷۧۡۜٷۦۖۆڷٷی
ھۀڿҒڽڽڿڷۤۤڷۃۂڿڷۃۣۢۨٷۻۢٷۛۦۍڷ۠ٷۣۢۨٷۢۦۙۨۢٲڷۗۧғۨۗٷےڷۤ۩ۣۦٰڷۨۢٷۨ۠یڷۘۢٷڷۧۨۗںۙө
ڽڽۀڼڼڼۀڽڿہڽہڼھڼڼۑҖۀڽڼڽғڼڽۃۣۘ
ۙۦۙۜڷ۟ۗ۠Өڷۃڷۣۧۢۧۧۡۦۙێڷۨۧۙ۩ۥۙې
ҢڽڼھڷۺٷیڷۀڼڷۣۢڷۀڼھғۂڿڽғڽڿғڿڿڷۃۧۧۙۦۘۘٷڷێٲڷۃۍІٲۛҖۦۣۘۛۙғۦۖۡٷۗ۠ۧғٷۢۦ۩ۣ۞ҖҖۃۤۨۨۜڷۣۡۦۚڷۘۙۘٷۣۣ۠ۢ۫ө
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits
and Militant Group Tactics
Max Abrahms and Philip B.K. Potter
Abstract
Certain types of militant groups—those suffering from leadership deficits
—are more likely to attack civilians. Their leadership deficits exacerbate the principalagent problem between leaders and foot soldiers, who have stronger incentives to harm
civilians. We establish the validity of this proposition with a tripartite research strategy
that balances generalizability and identification. First, we demonstrate in a sample of
militant organizations operating in the Middle East and North Africa that those
lacking centralized leadership are prone to targeting civilians. Second, we show that
when the leaderships of militant groups are degraded from drone strikes in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal regions, the selectivity of organizational violence plummets.
Third, we elucidate the mechanism with a detailed case study of the al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade, a Palestinian group that turned to terrorism during the Second Intifada
because pressure on leadership allowed low-level members to act on their preexisting
incentives to attack civilians. These findings indicate that a lack of principal control
is an important, underappreciated cause of militant group violence against civilians.
Terrorism is typically employed by the politically aggrieved, but recent scholarship
finds that the tactic tends to impede groups from achieving their demands. Unlike
selective attacks on military targets, indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets risk
lowering public support for concessions and hence the odds of attaining them.1
Why then do militant groups target civilians so frequently given the potential political
costs?
To answer this question, much of the extant scholarship posits that militant groups
are irrational actors or motivated by an apolitical incentive structure.2 Other studies
advance structural arguments about regime type and the relative power of militants.3
We thank Bob Axelrod, Christian Davenport, Jim Morrow, Steven Pinker, Al Stam, Janice Gross Stein,
and participants in seminars at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Munk School of Global
Affairs, Northeastern University, University of Michigan, University of Southern California, University of
Virginia, and University of Texas at Austin for helpful comments. Paul Baumgartner provided excellent
research assistance. We also acknowledge financial support from the Minerva Research Initiative. All
errors are our own.
1. On public support, see Berrebi and Klor 2006 and 2008; Chowanietz 2011; Mueller 2006; and Berrebi
2009. On government concessions, see Abrahms 2006 and 2012; Abrahms and Gottfried 2014; Cronin
2009; Fortna 2012; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2009; Getmansky and Sinmazdemir 2012; Jones and
Libicki 2008; and Neumann and Smith 2008.
2. On irrationality, see Caplan 2006; and Lankford 2013. On incentives, see Abrahms 2008; and
Weinstein 2007.
3. On regime type, see Stanton 2013. On relative capability, see Wood 2010.
International Organization 69, Spring 2015, pp. 311–342
© The IO Foundation, 2015
doi:10.1017/S0020818314000411
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These explanations are incomplete. First, they struggle to account for tactical variation within and across militant groups over time.4 Second, the groups are generally
treated as unitary actors despite the invalidity of that assumption.5 A growing consensus maintains that militant groups are composed of internally heterogeneous members
with varying preferences and commitment.6 We build on this insight to propose and
then test a theory of when militant groups are liable to engage in terrorism by targeting civilians.
Our core argument is that the extent of leadership control over the rank and file
strongly influences whether militant groups will attack civilians. Leadership deficits
promote civilian targeting because the incentives of members to perpetrate indiscriminate violence are inversely related to their position within the organizational hierarchy.
Organizations with weak leadership control gravitate to terrorism because tactical decisions are delegated to lower-level members with stronger incentives to harm civilians.
To explain the targeting choices of militant groups, we therefore draw on a principalagent framework where leaders are understood as principals and foot soldiers as agents.
Recent scholarship has applied aspects of this framework to other important questions about militant groups.7 We demonstrate its relevance to whether they engage in
terrorism by targeting civilians. Potential parallels are found within national militaries, where progovernment militias are significantly more likely than elite units to
attack civilians.8 Ill-disciplined government forces from the police to the army are
also disposed to sexual violence and other atrocities against the population.9 More
broadly, wayward agents of the state are associated with violating the laws of war.10
Anecdotal evidence abounds of militant groups attacking civilians because of a loss
of principal control. Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar routinely reproached his foot soldiers for indiscriminately attacking the population. He commanded his fighters to strike high-value targets such as “foreign invaders, their advisors,
their contractors and members of all associated military, intelligence and auxiliary departments,” but to “protect the lives and wealth of ordinary people.”11 Doku Umarov,
leader of the al-Qaida-linked Caucasus Emirate, likewise cautioned the Mujahedeen
“to focus their efforts on attacking law enforcement agencies, the military, the security
services, state officials,” but “to protect the civilian population.”12 The leader of the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Murat Karayilan, also directed his forces to engage “military
4. Weinstein 2007, for example, maintains that the behavior of rebel groups toward the population is
basically constant because it depends on their initial endowments. Groups are liable to harm civilians when
economic resources are accessible from the outset because these attract opportunistic, predatory members.
5. See Pearlman 2009; and Chenoweth et al. 2009.
6. See Gill and Young 2011; and Shapiro and Siegel 2012.
7. See Azam and Delacroix 2006; Byman and Kreps 2010; and Salehyan 2010.
8. See Felter 2008; Kalyvas 2006; Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2012; and Thomson 1994.
9. See Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell 2007; and Wood 2006.
10. Morrow 2007.
11. Quoted in Bill Roggio, “Taliban Announce Start of Al Farooq Spring Offensive,” Long War Journal
(Internet ed.), 2 May 2012.
12. Quoted in Dzutsev 2012.
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
313
targets” and “not harm civilians.”13 Similarly, the leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hafiz
Muhammad Saeed, blamed the 2008 Mumbai attacks and other instances of violence
against the population on uncontrolled “rogue elements within the group.”14 Even ostensible exceptions may prove the rule. Osama Bin Laden, the founder of modern-day
al-Qaida, was notorious for orchestrating the deadliest terrorist incident in history. Less
well known, however, is that he and his lieutenants subsequently admonished lowerlevel members for slaughtering civilians in Iraq, Yemen, and other Muslim-majority
countries as the strategic costs became apparent.15 The implication is that a particular
class of militant groups may be more likely to target civilians—those lacking strong
leadership control. All else equal, militant group violence should become less discriminate as members with stronger incentives to attack civilians gain tactical autonomy.
Beginning with the most general of tests, we find in a sample of militant groups operating in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that those lacking centralized leaderships are more than twice as likely to target civilians. MENA groups are also more
likely to engage in civilian targeting when the leaders are hindered from communicating
tactical instructions to the rank and file. We then examine the impact of the unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) campaign on the targeting choices of militant groups operating in
the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. When their leaderships are degraded through decapitation strikes, militant groups become significantly less discriminate in their targeting
choices. Finally, the mechanism behind these findings is scrutinized with a detailed
case study of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a Palestinian group that adopted terrorism
when its leadership was decimated during the Second Intifada (2000–2005) and
ceded tactical decision making to the rank and file. Our multipronged research strategy
balances competing concerns over generalizability and causal identification. The most
general tests are weakest on identification (the cross-sectional MENA analyses),
whereas the strongest on identification is least generalizable (the al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade case study). Together, however, the evidence consistently indicates that militant
groups are inclined toward civilian targeting when principals lose organizational control
and their agents are thus granted additional tactical autonomy.
Why Do Groups Resort to Terrorism?
The definition of terrorism remains contested, but it generally denotes nonstate
attacks against civilian targets for political ends.16 Upon reflection, however, this
combination of target selection and objective appears in tension. Across a wide
13. Quoted in Ertugrul Mavioglu, “Civilians in Turkey Off Target List, PKK Boss Says,” Hürriyet Daily
News (Internet ed.), 28 October 2010.
14. Quoted in Subrahmanian et al. 2013, 34.
15. Firouz Sedarat, “Bin Laden Against Attacks on Civilians, Deputy Says,” Reuters (Internet ed.), 24
February 2011. See also al-Zawahiri 2005.
16. See Cronin 2003; Ganor 2002; Hoffman 2006; Richardson 2006; Sambanis 2008; Schmid and
Jongman 2005; and Walzer 2002.
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variety of methodologies and disciplines, a growing body of empirical research finds
that attacking civilians is ineffective, even counterproductive for groups to achieve
their strategic demands. Terrorism may aid organizations in redressing their grievances under very specific conditions,17 but targeting civilians generally carries substantial downside political risks. Why then do so many militant groups employ this tactic
given the potential costs?
For decades, specialists have noted that terrorism rarely results in political success.
In the 1970s, Laqueur published “The Futility of Terrorism” in which he claimed that
practitioners seldom achieve their strategic demands.18 In the 1980s, Cordes,
Hoffman, and Jenkins observed that “terrorists have been unable to translate the consequences of terrorism into concrete political gains … In that sense terrorism has
failed. It is a fundamental failure.”19 Crenshaw also pointed out how “few [terrorist]
organizations actually attain the long-term ideological objectives they claim to seek,
and therefore one must conclude that terrorism is objectively a failure.”20 Schelling
proclaimed in the 1990s, “Terrorism almost never appears to accomplish anything
politically significant.”21 More recently, empirical studies confirmed that only a
handful of terrorist groups in modern history have managed to accomplish their
political platforms.22
Theoretical explanations may help to account for the low political success rate, but the
tactic does not appear to be epiphenomenal to government intransigence or the result of
selection bias.23 On the contrary, the latest wave of scholarship finds that escalating
violence against civilians actually hinders nonstate challengers from attaining their
demands. To evaluate the political efficacy of terrorism, Abrahms exploits variation
in the target selection of 125 violent nonstate campaigns.24 Groups are significantly
more likely to coerce government compliance when their violence is directed against
military targets instead of civilian ones even after controlling for the capability of the perpetrators, the nature of their demands, and other tactical confounds. After factoring out
the relative capabilities of rebel groups, Fortna finds that in civil war they too lower the
odds of bargaining success by attacking the population with terrorism.25 Getmansky and
Sinmazdemir find that the Israeli government in particular is significantly less likely to
cede land to the Palestinians when they have perpetrated terrorism.26 To mitigate selection bias, they exploit variation in the operational outcome of terrorist attacks; evidently,
17. Discrepant empirical studies are surprisingly few. Even those that report some strategic utility in terrorism tend to conclude that it backfires politically beyond a certain threshold of lethality. See Gould and
Klor 2010; and Wood and Kathman 2014.
18. Laqueur 1976.
19. Cordes et al. 1984, 49.
20. Crenshaw 1987, 15.
21. Schelling 1991, 20.
22. See Abrahms 2006; Cronin 2009; and Jones and Libicki 2008.
23. See DeNardo 1985; and Lake 2002.
24. Abrahms 2012.
25. Fortna 2012.
26. Getmansky and Sinmazdemir 2012.
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
315
only those that physically harm civilians inhibit Israeli concessions. In hostage settings,
Abrahms and Gottfried find that killing civilians lowers the chances of militant groups
attaining government concessions.27 Relatedly, Chenoweth and Stephan find that
protest groups suffer at the bargaining table when they engage in violence against the
population.28
Terrorism rarely frightens citizens of target countries into supporting more dovish
politicians. Studies on public opinion find that the attacks on civilians tend to raise
popular support for right-wing leaders opposed to appeasement. Berrebi and Klor,
for example, show that Palestinian terrorism boosts Israeli support for the Likud and
other right-bloc parties.29 Gould and Klor reveal that the most lethal Palestinian terrorist
attacks are the most likely to induce this rightward electoral shift.30 These trends appear
to be the international norm. Chowanietz analyzes variation in public opinion within
France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States from 1990 to
2006.31 In each target country, terrorist attacks have shifted the electorate to the political right in proportion to their lethality. Related observations have been registered after
al-Qaida and its affiliates killed civilians in Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, the Philippines,
Russia, Turkey, and the United States.32 Controlled experiments reach similar results,
further ruling out the possibility of a selection effect.33 RAND observes in a précis of
the literature: “Terrorist fatalities, with few exceptions, increase support for the bloc of
parties associated with a more intransigent position. Scholars may interpret this as
further evidence that terrorist attacks against civilians do not help terrorist organizations
achieve their stated goals.”34 By bolstering hardliners, terrorist attacks are also among
the most common ways for militant groups to end.35
Terrorism as a Principal-Agent Problem
Why, then, do groups indiscriminately attack civilians? More specifically, how do we
account for the tactical variation both within and across militant groups over time?
The answer may reside in the fact that militant groups exhibit substantial heterogeneity in terms of membership incentives and clout within the organization.
We maintain that the position of members within the organizational hierarchy
shapes their incentive structure over targeting civilians.36 Members’ incentives to
27. Abrahms and Gottfried 2014.
28. Chenoweth and Stephan 2011.
29. Berrebi and Klor 2006 and 2008.
30. Gould and Klor 2010.
31. Chowanietz 2011.
32. See Mueller 2006, 184, 587; Shapiro 2012, 5; and Wilkinson 1986, 52.
33. See Abrahms 2013.
34. Berrebi 2009, 189.
35. Cronin 2009.
36. A related argument comes from Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012, who make the case that
factionalization partly explains the resort to civilian targeting in self-determination movements.
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attack civilians are inversely related to their station within the group. By definition,
senior leaders carry more sway within militant groups than their foot soldiers,
whereas in between these stylized categories are midlevel leaders. The target selection of militant groups consequently depends on leadership control, particularly
from the top. Leadership deficits in militant groups foster indiscriminate attacks by
ceding tactical decisions to lower-level members with weaker incentives against
harming civilians. Militant groups gravitate to terrorism not when low-level
members completely take over, but when empowered to pursue their divergent
preferences.37
For numerous reasons, the position of members within the organizational hierarchy
is inversely related to their incentives for attacking civilians. First, senior leaders are
generally the oldest members of the group and have spent the longest time working in
it. In fact, the top leaders of militant groups are often their founders.38 Foot soldiers
and other low-level operatives, by contrast, are typically the newest recruits or volunteers with the least experience at any level of combat.39 Based on their relative exposure to conflict, senior leaders are thus the most likely to have personally observed the
strategic fallout of indiscriminate bloodshed and to consequently oppose such counterproductive targeting practices. Second, the lowest members of militant groups
have the fewest resources at their disposal, incentivizing them to attack softer
targets.40 Because more senior members are in a superior position within the organizational hierarchy, they have greater discretion in marshaling resources for
comparatively sophisticated attacks against hardened targets. Third, the lowestlevel members stand to gain the most from civilian targeting. Their dearth of organizational resources incentivizes predation of civilian assets, which can be furthered
through the intimidation that inevitably accompanies indiscriminate violence.
Attacks on civilians also help lower-level members to ascend within the group by
“outbidding” rival members, whereas the senior leadership is already at the organizational apex.41 Further, foot soldiers are the most likely to have lost close friends
on the front line, creating even stronger incentives to perpetrate attacks on civilians
to avenge such personal losses.42 Finally, the senior leadership presumably has
longer time horizons than lower-level members for achieving the organization’s political cause. Not only have leaders spent the most time operating within the
37. Decentralized leaderships abound for a variety of reasons. Leaders of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,
for example, were captured and killed during the Second Intifada, creating a temporary leadership deficit.
The persistent targeting of al-Qaida’s leaders after the US invasion of Afghanistan drove them underground, impairing operational control. And, because of historical legacy, some organizations such as anarchist groups may never develop strong leaders in the first place.
38. See Cronin 2006.
39. See Sageman 2004 and 2008, on the age and experience of militant leaders relative to lower-level
members.
40. See Shapiro and Siegel 2007.
41. See Bloom 2004, though her claim focuses on competition between organizations rather than within
them.
42. See Moghadam 2006.
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
317
organization, but they are more constrained from leaving it. Whereas lower-level
members may have the option of fading back into the population, leaders are more
likely to be organizational lifers because they are easier for authorities to identify.
Because lower-level members have shorter time horizons, they are more likely to prioritize short-term gains from civilian targeting over longer-term strategy. The result is
an essential difference in commitment. Hinting at both this problem and the principalagent problems and tradeoffs that it in engenders, Shapiro and Siegel note, “terrorist
groups repeatedly include operatives of varying commitment and often rely on a
common set of security-reducing bureaucratic tools to manage these individuals.”43
In sum, the differences in targeting preferences hail less from any inherent cognitive
qualities among members than from their relative stations within the organization,
which shape incentives for or against civilian targeting.44
This organizational explanation for terrorism has a strong theoretical basis.
Principal-agent theory emphasizes a disconnect between the preferences of leaders
and the actual behavior of subordinates, which often runs counter to the formal
mission of the organization.45 As previous research details, agency problems arise
because prospective members have an incentive to manipulate private information
by overstating their qualifications (that is, adverse selection) and to then pursue
private agendas upon joining (that is, agency slack or moral hazard).46 Agency problems are inherent in all organizations, but leadership deficits understandably exacerbate them because principals must delegate authority to less reliable agents.47
It is impossible to test directly whether agency problems are responsible for suboptimal organizational behavior.48 But a basic premise of organizational theory is
that group structure affects the locus of decision making. As such, group structure
is a standard proxy for leadership control in numerous organizational contexts,49 including militant groups.50 The more centralized an organization, the less autonomy is
delegated to subordinates.51 Few studies on terrorism consider the potential downside
of decentralization from the perspective of the challenger.52 Decentralization is characteristically described as an unconditional best practice against the defender. As with
other organizations, decentralization is thought to unleash the human potential of
43. Shapiro and Siegel 2012, 41. See also Shapiro 2013 for a longer treatment of terrorist groups’ structures and management techniques.
44. The implication is that these incentives will change as members rise or fall within the organization.
Weinstein 2007 also proposes an organizational explanation for civilian targeting, but it is an unintended
organizational by-product rather than the consequence of any rational pursuit of objectives. On this point,
see Kalyvas 2007.
45. See Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991.
46. See Hawkins et al. 2006; and Milner 2006.
47. See Alter 2006; Cortell and Peterson 2006; Gould 2006; Hawkins et al. 2006; Hawkins and Jacoby
2006 and 2008; Lake 2007; and Pollack 1997.
48. Pollack 2002.
49. See Ferrell and Skinner 1988; and Krahmann 2003.
50. See Arquilla and Karasik 1999; and Stepanova 2008.
51. See Galbraith 2007; Mulder 1960; Pugh 1973; and Zey-Ferrell 1979.
52. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008.
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militant groups by making them more adaptive, flexible, inclusive, innovative, resilient, and specialized. More concretely, decentralization is said to confer a bounty of
strategic advantages by rendering organizations harder to anticipate, detect, infiltrate,
isolate, prosecute, and ultimately defeat.53
Despite such advantages of decentralization, the application of principal-agent
theory predicts inherent tradeoffs to delegation.54 Empowering foot soldiers with
greater tactical autonomy is not cost-free precisely because it means ceding control
to members with incentive structures that coincide imperfectly with leadership imperatives. The nature of organizational violence may therefore hinge on the structure of
militant groups, leading to our first hypothesis:
H1: Organizations with decentralized leadership are more likely to target civilians
than are organizations with centralized leadership.
To gain insight into whether civilian targeting springs from a loss of principal control,
it is essential to incorporate whether leaders approve of their members engaging in
terrorism. Based on our organizational explanation, groups should be less likely to
attack civilians when leaders publicly oppose this practice, though the ability to
impose this preference should be conditional on their strength. Specifically, militant
organizations should be least likely to target civilians when their leaders are strong
and oppose civilian targeting because they are best equipped to tamp down these displays of radicalism to serve their strategic ends. Conversely, militant group violence
should be least restrained when leaders are weak and advocate civilian targeting. As
their position strengthens within the organization, its violence should become more
selective because even leaders who initially advocate civilian targeting may realize
that indiscriminate violence is ultimately counterproductive. Further, militant
leaders sometimes issue threats without actually directing their members to carry
them out.55 Together, these expectations yield the following conditional hypotheses:
H2A: Organizations are least likely to target civilians when leaders are strong and
do not publicly authorize civilian targeting.
H2B: Organizations are most likely to target civilians when leaders are weak and
publicly authorize civilian targeting.
Beyond their organizational structure, other aspects of militant groups also affect
leadership control. Communications are essential in all organizations for members
at the top to convey information to those at the bottom. When such communications
are impeded, agency loss is inevitable as lower-level members are compelled to act
53. See Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999; Gunaranta 2002; Hoffman 2003; Joosse 2007; Greenberg,
Wechsler, and Wolosky 2002; and Kaplan 1997.
54. See Lake and McCubbins 2006; and Gould 2003.
55. See al-Zawahiri 2005.
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
319
more independently.56 The ability of militant leaders to communicate with subordinates may vary for a number of reasons. The leadership often prioritizes security
over communications by encouraging the organization to operate in more secretive
ways.57 Communications are also hampered when operatives expand their theater
of operations, particularly abroad. This logic generates the following additional
hypotheses:
H3: Clandestine organizations are more likely than open organizations to target
civilians.
H4: International organizations are more likely than domestic organizations to
target civilians.
H5: Organizations that frequently conduct cross-border attacks are more likely to
target civilians.
Admittedly, these predicted empirical relationships may arise from reverse causation.
Skeptics may wonder, for example, whether leaders structure the organization based
on their targeting preferences, whether organizations are clandestine to minimize
audience costs from targeting civilians, and whether foot soldiers expand their
theater of operations to punish foreign populations.58
To address these concerns, we turn to another empirical strategy. Decapitation
campaigns are exogenous to the preferences of militant group members but deeply
affect organizational structure, communications, and thus leadership control. The explicit goal of the ongoing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) campaigns against alQaida, the Taliban, and affiliates is to degrade their leaderships.59 Our organizational
theory therefore predicts specific changes in the targeting practices of these groups in
response to the UAV campaign. Operationally successful decapitation strikes obviously weaken the leadership, endowing lower-level members with additional tactical
autonomy. Regardless of whether the strike actually connects with the target, though,
the attempt itself may degrade command by forcing leaders to curtail communication,
question the loyalty of subordinates, go into hiding, and thereby lower their profile
within the organization. These insights inform two other hypotheses.
56. See Hawkins et al. 2006; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006 and 2008; and Pollack 1997.
57. On the tradeoff between security and communication, see Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001.
58. In fact, existing research suggests that weak leaderships tend to arise from external pressures on organizations to prioritize robustness over operational control. On this tradeoff, see Arquilla and Ronfeldt
2001. Leaders normally wish to exert maximum influence, but are sometimes constrained in the face of
government repression. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “All About the Benjamins: Why
Bashar al-Assad Won’t Go,” Foreign Policy (Internet ed.), 12 December 2012.
59. Brennan 2012. For a small sample of the growing literature on decapitation strikes, see Johnston
2012; Jordan 2009; and Price 2012.
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H6: Operationally successful UAV strikes are positively associated with attacks on
civilains.
H7: UAV strike density is positively associated with attacks on civilians.
Research Design and Findings
To test our initial proposition that decentralized organizations are more likely to perpetrate terrorism, we investigate the determinants of civilian targeting among the
militant groups in the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) data
set.60 MAROB has several advantages over comparable data sets for our research purposes.61 First, MAROB codes for group structure, which facilitates assessment of
whether militant organizations are disproportionately inclined to civilian targeting
when their decision making is diffuse. Second, MAROB furnishes data on whether
the groups attacked civilian targets, military ones, or none at all, capturing such tactical variation from 1980 to 2004.62 Third, all of the groups in the sample are nonstate
actors that express political aims. Fourth, the sample focuses on groups operating in
Middle Eastern and North African countries, intrinsically important regions for the
study of conflict in general and civilian targeting in particular. Fifth, the sample includes scores of organizations that are sometimes described as terrorist groups, but
which are often omitted from civil war data sets for operating outside this particular
context.63
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the organizations
target civilians (1) or not (0) in a given year.64 Civilian targets include any nonsecurity state personnel, thereby excluding military or police forces.65 To assess H1, we
rely on a binary measure of whether the group is centralized (1) or not (0). We collapse the MAROB variable LEAD such that groups with either factionalized or weak
leaderships are characterized as decentralized, whereas those with a strong ruling
council or strong single leader are treated as centralized. Thus, the MAROB data
60. Asal, Pate, and Wilkenfeld 2008. The unit of analysis is the organization year. We limit the models to
militant organizations, but the findings extend even when nonviolent organizations are included in the
sample.
61. We believe the advantages of MAROB outweigh its disadvantages, but these are also addressed later.
62. Where possible, we have confirmed this information with the incident data found in the Global
Terrorism Database, available at <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>. See National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 2012.
63. Our results are not driven by militant organizations engaged in full-scale civil wars. There are only
five cases in the data and the findings hold when these observations are omitted. Some previous research
focuses exclusively on indiscriminate violence within civil wars. See, for example, Humphreys and
Weinstein 2006; and Weinstein 2007.
64. We also assess ordered models that disaggregate levels of attacks on civilians and reach similar conclusions. We do not treat these as the primary models because of concerns over data reliability and because
our primary theoretical interest is in the targeting of civilians in an absolute sense. The breach of the threshold into civilian targeting and the level of carnage once breached may be driven by somewhat different
processes.
65. We derive this indicator from the MAROB ORGST7 variable.
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
321
codes the extent to which the leadership exerts unified command over lower-level
members.
We also include a variety of control variables to account for potential confounds
with our key independent variable of organizational structure and the dependent
measure of civilian targeting. These controls hold constant relevant organizationand country-level attributes based on the broader conflict literature.
Capability is arguably relevant to militant group target selection. At least two studies
have found that state challengers are disposed to civilian victimization when weak (or
“desperate”).66 More commonly, scholars assert that terrorism is a “weapon of the
weak” though this adage is empirically contested.67 We employ several proxies for organizational capability to help disentangle this potential influence on target selection. In
line with a RAND study, we control for the age of groups with a count variable based
on the number of years since their founding.68 The relationship between organizational
age and capability is not straightforward. Horowitz finds an inverse relationship
between the lifespan of terrorist groups and their innovative capacity, whereas
Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden observe that organizations procure resources over
time with weaker organizations selected out of the population.69 Miller and Scott
believe age promotes effectiveness because older organizations are liable to be standardized and routinized, making their performance less unstable and susceptible to a
liability of newness.70 We also account for organizational membership size because
nonstate challengers gain power in numbers,71 as well as for whether the organization
holds territory, which helps to secure resources from the local population.72 At the domestic level, we address the extent of both popular support for the organization and its
outreach efforts by controlling for propaganda and educational output.73
The ideology of militant groups is another potential confound. Juergensmeyer and
Hoffman believe that the universalist nature of religious motivations promotes larger
attacks by enabling adherents to discount the negative consequences of mass casualties.74 The “cosmic wars” perceived by religiously motivated groups might dispose
them toward deadlier indiscriminate attacks. Even Pape, who maintains that occupation is the “taproot” of suicide terrorism, identifies religious differences as an
66. See Downes 2006; and Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004.
67. Crozier 1960 coined the adage and many other researchers have since repeated it as fact despite discrepant empirical findings (for example, Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Fortna 2012; Goodwin 2006; and
Laqueur 1977).
68. Jones and Libicki 2008.
69. See Horowitz 2010; and Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden 1996.
70. See Miller 2008; and Scott 1987.
71. DeNardo 1985. We employ Asal and Rethemeyer 2008 data on organizational size for the minority
of cases that appear in both data sets. Our research assistants coded the remaining cases according to the
same criteria.
72. Lilja 2009. We rely on the MAROB ORGST9 variable to code whether the organization occupies or
administers territory. Controlling for this variable helps to account for Weinstein’s hypothesis that predatory groups prey on the population for short-term payoffs. Weinstein 2007.
73. Smith and Walsh 2013.
74. See Juergensmeyer 2000; and Hoffman 1998.
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International Organization
important predictor.75 We control for religiously and ethnically motivated groups
because these characteristics promote sectarian violence and are a common precondition for civil strife generally.76 Both ideologies may also be confounded with leadership structure because of altered incentives and relationships with religious- or kinbased hierarchies.
At the state level, we are mainly interested in accounting for factors that may insulate targets from terrorism and covary with organizational structure. Population
density is relevant, for example, because higher values increase potential targets.
Following Walsh and Piazza, we also account for educational attainment and gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita even though opinion remains divided over
whether these characteristics provoke terrorism.77 Regime type is also addressed;
democracies reportedly attract terrorism because their commitment to civil liberties
impedes them from adopting harsh countermeasures and their low civilian cost
tolerance invites political blackmail.78 Because counterterrorism responses frequently
encounter collective action problems, we control for levels of executive authority affecting the capacity to act independently on behalf of citizens.79 With Banks’s data,
we control for the extent of ongoing conflict within the country, which may reflect
unobservable conditions ripe for terrorism or even perpetuate it.80
To establish whether civilian targeting arises from a loss of principal control, we
also explore the extent to which leaders approve of their members engaging in terrorism. Conveniently, MAROB supplies data on whether the leaders publicly authorize
civilian targeting. This information is invaluable for determining whether weak
leaders are associated with terrorism due to their tactical preferences, indifference,
or lack of agency control.
Table 1 presents the results of seven logistic regressions.81 Following Achen,
Model 1 is a bivariate test of the relationship between leadership strength and
target selection.82 This model also allows us to maintain the maximum available
data, while bolstering confidence that the observed effect of group structure is not
a function of bias generated by missing data in the covariates.83 Models 2 to 5 incorporate the dummy variable for whether the organization leader authorizes civilian
75. Pape 2005.
76. See Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; and Gurr 2000.
77. See Walsh and Piazza 2010; Li and Schaub 2004; and Abadie 2006.
78. See Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Li 2005; and Pape 2003. For an opposing view, see Abrahms 2007;
and Lyall 2010.
79. Sandler 2005.
80. Banks and Wilson 2013.
81. Logistic regression requires that both events and nonevents are independent. This assumption is
violated by civilian targeting if it elevates the risk of future terrorism, as has been suggested in the conflict
literature. See Collier and Hoeffler 2004. To sidestep this potential issue, we employ the corrections suggested by Carter and Signorino 2010.
82. Achen 2002 and 2005.
83. King et al. 2001. We also explored imputation as a solution to this problem and obtained substantially
identical results.
TABLE 1.
Civilian targeting
Model 1 β/(SE)
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
−0.473*
(0.207)
LEADER SANCTION
STRUCTURE × SANCTION
Model 2 β/(SE)
−0.511*
(0.230)
16.214***
(0.426)
−13.362***
(0.527)
Model 3 β/(SE)
Model 4 β/(SE)
Model 5 β/(SE)
Model 6 β/(SE)
Model 7 β/(SE)
−0.438
(0.293)
14.708***
(0.534)
−12.340***
(0.605)
−0.731
(0.517)
15.676***
(0.722)
−14.135***
(0.795)
0.892
(0.963)
8.630***
(1.692)
−6.907***
(1.742)
−0.142
(0.352)
15.735***
(0.653)
−13.683***
(0.710)
−0.244
(0.614)
14.570***
(1.429)
−12.960***
(1.529)
−0.026**
(0.009)
−0.045
(0.121)
0.119
(0.179)
−0.013
(0.263)
0.880***
(0.155)
0.163
(0.242)
−0.462*
(0.210)
−0.062***
(0.016)
0.467*
(0.222)
0.586*
(0.294)
0.136
(0.392)
0.916***
(0.204)
0.611
(0.439)
0.827+
(0.501)
0.604
(1.145)
0.217
(0.980)
−2.034*
(0.910)
0.837
(2.004)
2.417***
(0.495)
14.109
(22.693)
25.308**
(9.697)
−0.026**
(0.009)
0.053
(0.142)
0.454+
(0.232)
0.055
(0.275)
0.825***
(0.168)
0.792**
(0.289)
0.567+
(0.342)
1.917*
(0.910)
−0.942*
(0.473)
0.092
(0.377)
0.814
(1.304)
1.287**
(0.441)
23.808*
(9.602)
−32.952*
(13.713)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.001*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
−2.292***
(0.429)
2.000***
(0.362)
−0.000
(0.000)
587
0.004*
(0.002)
−0.005**
(0.002)
0.001**
(0.000)
−16.229***
(3.692)
16.965***
(3.709)
−0.000*
(0.000)
407
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.001**
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
−1.341***
(0.258)
1.342***
(0.233)
0.000
(0.000)
1,004
0.001
(0.000)
−0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
−1.658*
(0.777)
2.115**
(0.799)
0.000
(0.000)
749
Organizational covariates
ORGANIZATIONAL AGE
ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE
TERRITORIAL CONTROL
POPULAR SUPPORT
PROPAGANDA
RELIGIOUS
ETHNONATIONALIST
State covariates
POPULATION DENSITY
PRIMARY & SECONDARY EDUCATION
GDPPC
REGIME
EFFECTIVE EXECUTIVE
CONFLICT INDEX
N
998
997
910
Notes: Estimates are maximum likelihood coefficients obtained from logit equations with the organization year as the unit of analysis. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models
include year fixed effects. + <.10; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001.
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International Organization
targeting as well as an interaction term between this indicator and leadership
strength.84 Model 2 is limited to just the interaction and its components. Model 3 includes the organizational covariates, whereas Model 4 integrates the state-level covariates as well. Model 5 is identical to Model 4 but employs organization fixed
effects (all five models contain year fixed effects).
The declining number of observations from Model 1 to Model 5 is because of
missing data. There are missing observations in all the independent variables, especially in the state-level covariates, although there does not appear to be systematic
structure to what is missing that would cause particular concern. As an additional
check, we reran Models 4 and 5 with imputed missing values. These models
(Models 6 and 7) yield similar results overall. The main difference is that the coefficient for the interaction term more closely resembles results from Models 1 to 4 rather
than Model 5, suggesting that the decline in magnitude in that model stems from
missing data rather than from the organizational fixed effects.
As anticipated, the coefficient for our key organizational structure variable in
Model 1 is negative and significant. Interpreting the magnitude of coefficients,
however, is not intuitive in maximum likelihood models. Moreover, the key question
is not the difference between the estimates and zero, but whether weak and strong
leaderships are distinguishable with regard to organizational targeting. In practical
terms, there is a decline from an approximately 40 percent chance that a decentralized
group will attack civilians to a 25 percent chance of a centralized group doing so.
Militant groups with weak leaderships are thus about 15 percent more likely to
target civilians. Groups led by weak leaders are indeed highly associated with civilian
targeting at least in MENA countries.
Although this preliminary finding links civilian targeting to groups with weak leadership, it leaves unclear whether such leaders disproportionately support indiscriminate violence, whether it stems from a loss of principal control, or whether
weak leaders are associated with terrorism simply because they do not care about
their organization’s specific tactical choices. In the parlance of principal-agent
theory, foot soldiers may have broad discretion over which targets to attack; discretion entails a grant of authority to achieve the principal’s goal but does not stipulate
the specific actions for agents to attain it.85
The more important consideration, then, is the conditional relationship between
leadership strength and targeting preferences. Consistent with our expectations, the
interaction and authorization variables in Models 2 to 5 are negative and significant.
Figure 1 depicts the predicted probabilities of militant groups attacking civilians depending on the strength of the leaders and their public position on it. The most salient
feature is that militant groups seldom commit terrorism when strong leaders do not
authorize attacks on civilians. Under these conditions, the rank and file overrides
the tactical instructions of their leaders by committing terrorism only 15 percent of
84. The indicator is adapted from the MAROB VIOLRHETDOM and VIOLRHETRANS variables.
85. Hawkins et al. 2006.
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
325
the time. By contrast, the militant groups in our sample invariably engage in terrorism
when their leaders are weak and publicly authorize civilian targeting.86 Among organizations with strong leaderships, there is a substantively and statistically significant
difference between those who authorize terrorism and those who do not, underlining
their strong tactical influence. Of course, the decision to publicly authorize terrorism
may itself be strategic. For instance, weaker leaders may issue post hoc appeals for
civilian targeting to appear in control. The most informative comparisons are therefore within the categories of weak and strong leadership rather than between them.
FIGURE 1.
Probability of targeting civilians
Our organizational theory points to other implications that are testable with the
MAROB data. Should the anticipated theoretical relationships hold in these alternative constructions, they would strengthen confidence in our argument behind militant
group targeting. As we have outlined, communications are essential for leaders to exercise control over lower-level members. When communications from the top are hindered, foot soldiers and other operatives must rely on instruction from lower-level
leaders or even act independently, thereby eroding principal control.
Table 2 presents the results of three additional models assessing this expectation.
Model 1 tests whether clandestine organizations (MAROB variable ORGOPEN) are
disposed toward civilian targeting from prioritizing security over communications.
86. There are relatively few (ten) of these observations in the data.
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Models 2 and 3 evaluate two other measures affecting the leadership’s ability to communicate with subordinates—whether the theater of operations is essentially “international” (MAROB variable ORGLOCVIOL) and whether the groups frequently
engage in “cross-border” raids (MAROB variable ORGST8A). The specific rationale
behind these tests is that international attacks are more likely to be geographically dispersed, inhibiting communications as operatives travel away from their leaders.
Further, operating in foreign countries requires militants to hide among hostile populations, impeding the flow of information from the top.
TABLE 2.
The influence of communication on civilian targeting
Model 1 β/(SE)
OPEN ORGANIZATION
Model 2 β/(SE)
Model 3 β/(SE)
−0.906**
(0.318)
1.784***
(0.210)
VIOLENCE ABROAD
CROSS - BORDER INSURGENCY
1.958***
(0.355)
Organizational covariates
ORGANIZATIONAL AGE
ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE
TERRITORIAL CONTROL
POPULAR SUPPORT
PROPAGANDA
RELIGIOUS
ETHNONATIONALIST
−0.044***
(0.013)
0.594***
(0.161)
0.666*
(0.270)
−0.295
(0.342)
0.693***
(0.168)
0.216
(0.314)
1.024*
(0.437)
−0.026+
(0.014)
0.667***
(0.181)
0.855**
(0.293)
−0.521
(0.340)
0.554**
(0.189)
0.701+
(0.378)
1.052*
(0.479)
−0.035**
(0.014)
0.753***
(0.166)
0.852**
(0.275)
−0.623+
(0.341)
0.651***
(0.173)
0.314
(0.351)
1.092**
(0.422)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.001*
(0.001)
0.000+
(0.000)
−2.319***
(0.403)
1.606***
(0.294)
−0.000*
(0.000)
668
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.002**
(0.001)
0.000***
(0.000)
−2.355***
(0.454)
1.346***
(0.331)
−0.000**
(0.000)
655
−0.000*
(0.000)
−0.002***
(0.001)
0.000**
(0.000)
−2.516***
(0.398)
1.629***
(0.302)
−0.000**
(0.000)
665
State covariates
POPULATION DENSITY
EDUCATION
GDPPC
REGIME
EFFECTIVE EXECUTIVE
CONFLICT INDEX
N
Notes: Estimates are maximum likelihood coefficients obtained from logit equations with the organization year as the unit
of analysis. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +<.10; *p<.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001.
The key coefficients in these models are significant and run in the anticipated
direction. To illustrate the substantive impact, Figure 2 presents three graphs based
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
327
on results from the corresponding models in Table 2. Groups are roughly twice as
likely to engage in civilian targeting when clandestine, international, or involved in
cross-border raids. These results further illustrate how militant groups are prone to
terrorism when lower-level members call more of the shots.
FIGURE 2.
Communication and Civilian Targeting
Although these cross-national findings are quite robust, we gain confidence by
testing the theory from another angle with different data. The ongoing UAV campaign in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal regions enables additional assessment
because the explicit purpose is to diminish the militant group leaderships through
decapitation strikes.
Information on these strikes comes from the New America Foundation’s Drone
Database. This database is an aggregation of credible news reports from international
wire services (Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France Presse), leading Pakistani
newspapers (Dawn, Express Times, The News, The Daily Times), South Asian and
Middle Eastern television networks (Geo TV, Al Jazeera), and reputable Western
outlets with extensive regional coverage (CNN, New York Times, Washington
Post, Los Angeles Times, BBC, The Guardian). For inclusion in the database, each
targeting event was independently verified by at least two of these sources.87
87. We thank Jennifer Rowland and Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation for supplying the
complete data set.
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The Drone Database supplies information on the timing of the decapitation strike
attempts and operational outcomes—both of which should affect leadership influence
over the rank and file. When a decapitation strike kills any level of leader, subordinates are given a freer hand in conducting operations, thereby ceding autonomy to
members with stronger incentives to harm civilians. Even when a strike fails to
connect with the target, it forces the leader and others at the top level to assume a diminished posture within the organization to prioritize security over control, resulting in
agency loss.88
We match data on UAV strikes with information on militant group target selection
from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). As before, we disaggregate organization
attacks on soft targets versus hard ones, that is, against civilians versus military and
police forces. Regional authorities have tended to treat al-Qaida, the Taliban, and
local affiliates as a single unit within the territory because of their close operational
coordination during our observation period (2004–11).89 Our estimation strategy
follows this approach by treating the overlapping groups as a single organizational
entity. Any bias generated from aggregating unlike units would almost certainly attenuate the results.
Table 3 presents the coefficients from three new models. The first is a fractional
logit regression on the selectivity of militant group violence calculated as a proportion
of civilian attacks to total attacks (civilian and military). We then scrutinize the targeting behavior by pulling apart that proportion to assess its constituent parts. The
second model is thus a negative binomial regression on the number of attacks
against civilian targets in particular. Model 3 repeats that exercise, but for military
targets rather than civilian ones. In all three models, the unit of analysis is the day
within the period of analysis. We employ fixed effects to help isolate the impact of
decapitation strikes on militant group targeting choices.90 To assist with identifying
the changing effects of target selection over time, we lag both the number of decapitation attempts and leaders killed by them over a three-week period.
All three models indicate that the decapitation campaign renders the target selection of the militant groups less discriminate. Model 1 reveals that when a leader of
the militant group is killed, the proportion of its violence against civilian targets
rises by approximately 7 percent. Strike density has a similar short-term effect on
group tactics. Regardless of the target’s fate, a decapitation attempt increases the proportion of attacks against civilian targets by 6.5 percent. The preliminary evidence
therefore suggests that militant group violence loses selectivity when lower-level
88. Because of the substantial variation in the effectiveness of the UAV strikes, these variables are correlated at the 0.43 level only. Although this is certainly substantially positive, it is manageable. We include
both variables in the model because of the important conceptual distinctions between them, which we seek
to test.
89. See Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 2011; and International Crisis Group
2008.
90. Similar results emerge from week fixed effects to address seasonality and year fixed effects to
address change over the temporal span of the investigation. The results that follow are for week fixed
effects.
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
329
members are required to assume additional tactical responsibilities because their
leaders are killed or forced into hiding for self-preservation.
TABLE 3.
Decapitation strikes and target selection
LEADERS KILLED
LEADERS KILLEDt−1
LEADERS KILLEDt−2
DRONE STRIKES
DRONE STRIKESt−1
DRONE STRIKESt−2
N
Model 1
Civilian targets/attacks β/(SE)
Model 2
Civilian targets β/(SE)
Model 3
Military targets β/(SE)
0.275*
(0.126)
0.043
(0.126)
−0.005
(0.126)
0.209***
(0.058)
0.150**
(0.057)
0.298***
(0.058)
2,902
0.272***
(0.076)
−0.040
(0.082)
0.027
(0.082)
0.140***
(0.037)
0.165***
(0.036)
0.181***
(0.037)
2,902
−0.246
(0.181)
−0.500**
(0.191)
−0.776***
(0.207)
−0.118
(0.072)
0.001
(0.066)
0.013
(0.067)
2,902
Notes: Model 1 is a fractional logit. Coefficients in Models 2 and 3 are derived from negative binomial models. All
models have a daily unit of analysis and contain week fixed effects. *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001.
More insight can be gained by pulling this proportion apart. Group violence may
become less discriminate through increased attacks on soft targets, decreased attacks
on hard targets, or both. In accordance with our theory, Models 2 and 3 indicate
that decapitation strikes promote civilian targeting and decrease military targeting.
Strike density and success appear to influence these outcomes differently. In
general, strike density appears to have a strong positive effect on civilian targeting
but little influence on military targeting. By contrast, successful decapitation
strikes are associated with both an increase in civilian targeting and a decrease in military targeting, though in different time frames.91
To help illustrate the marked uptick in civilian targeting from the decapitation campaign, panel 1 of Figure 3 plots the predicted number of civilian targets and the
number of strike attempts.92 Over the span of that variable, the number of attacks
per day on civilians nearly triples from .50 to 1.50. Strikes, regardless of whether
they actually connect with the target, apparently put enough pressure on leaders to
weaken their command and control over the rank and file. As anticipated, operationally successful decapitation strikes have an immediate and substantial impact on
91. Strike density appears to have a more long-term effect on civilian targeting, perhaps because a
barrage of attacks against the leadership is more consistently disruptive to command and control,
whereas the actual killing of leaders leaves a short-term opening that is filled relatively quickly. In
terms of military targeting, the negative effect from killing leaders is observable only in the two- and
three-week lags, perhaps because such selective attacks require more elaborate planning.
92. The numbers are derived from the “DRONE STRIKES” coefficeient in Model 2, Table 3.
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International Organization
civilian targeting; when just one leader is killed, predicted civilian targeting rises suddenly by approximately 40 percent.93
FIGURE 3.
Civilian and Military Targeting
By contrast, the influence of the UAV campaign on the probability of attacks on
military targets appears only when strikes are actually successful in neutralizing leadership. This finding accords with our argument that such targets are the top priority of
high-level leadership. Also telling is that this effect appears after a short lag, presumably because of the role of central planning in these attacks. Once plans are developed
and delegated, the attacks already in the pipeline may proceed even in the absence of
leadership. What declines is the next round of selective attacks because they never get
planned. Thus, the right-hand panel of Figure 3 reveals how the UAV campaign
lowers the likelihood of attacks against military targets. There is a reduction in the
rate of attacks against hard targets from one every five days to one every twenty
days when two leaders have been successfully neutralized in the prior week.94
True to our principal-agent theory, groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal
regions appear far more likely to target civilians as the influence of leaders over
the rank and file recedes.
93. The numbers are derived from the “LEADERS KILLED” coefficient in Model 2, Table 3.
94. The numbers are derived from the “LEADERS KILLED t−2” coefficient in Model 3, Table 3.
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
331
These findings dovetail with recent empirical research suggesting that decapitation
strikes may be strategically effective.95 The UAV campaign in Afghanistan-Pakistan
limits attacks on coalition and government security forces, at least in the short term.
The corresponding increase in civilian targeting is clearly undesirable from a normative perspective, but it also puts at risk the militants’ support base and thus their
overall capabilities. That said, nothing in our work speaks to the extent to which collateral damage or infringements on sovereignty might lead to popular resentment.
Although beyond the scope of this study, these additional considerations must also
be taken into account before clear policy prescriptions can be made.
The Case of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
The preceding analyses establish generalizable empirical relationships, but case
studies can aid in further establishing the mechanism.96 The al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade exemplifies how leadership deficits within the organization led it to target
civilians during the Second Intifada (2000–2005). Consistent with our organizational
theory, the historical record reveals that (1) the Brigade leadership consistently
favored selective violence to create a Palestinian state; (2) the Brigade’s target selection became less discriminate as the Intifada unfolded; (3) the diminished targeting
selectivity was attributable to a loss of principal control over Brigade operatives as
a result of Israeli decapitation strikes; and (4) whereas the leadership recognized
that attacks on civilians are politically counterproductive, lower-level members perpetrated them for alternative—albeit no less rational—reasons based on their station
within the organization.
As the military wing of Yasser Arafat’s secular Fatah Party, the Brigade was established in September 2000 to pressure Israel into withdrawing from territories captured
in the 1967 war.97 To end the occupation of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza
Strip, Brigade chief Marwan Barghouti advocated selective attacks against the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and settlement outposts, while opposing indiscriminate
violence against Israeli civilians within the pre-1967 borders or so-called Green
Line.98 Barghouti stated in interviews: “We said we would not attack inside the
Green Line. The real face of the occupation is the settlements and the soldiers.”99
He repeatedly emphasized that “Fatah’s line is only targets outside of [19]67
95. See, for example, Johnston 2012.
96. See George and Bennett 2005. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is our chosen case for two reasons. The
Israel Defense Forces degraded the leadership during the Second Intifada in a sustained decapitation campaign, and a wealth of fine-grained information is available on this particular group’s internal dynamics.
97. Fletcher 2008.
98. Friedman 2008.
99. Quoted in Nahum Barnea, “We Want to Liberate You,” Yedioth Ahronoth (Internet ed.), 2 September
2001.
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borders,”100 that “Our policy in Fatah has been to restrict our actions to the territories,”101 and that “I, and the Fatah movement to which I belong, strongly
oppose attacks and the targeting of civilians inside Israel, our future neighbor.”102
Fatah leader Hussam Khader also stressed the strategic importance of selective violence against Israelis, “When they realize that there are no civilian casualties and only
soldiers dying in a foreign land, it will spark a change we need on the Israeli street to
bring an end to the occupation.”103 Even Arafat expressed “total opposition to actions
targeting civilians on both sides.”104 This position went largely unchallenged among
lower-level Brigade leaders. The head of the Bethlehem network declared that
harming Israeli civilians is “completely unacceptable to us in al-Aqsa” and that
instead “Our strategy is to fight settlement and settlers [by] attacking Israeli military
posts.”105 A Ramallah-based Brigade leader reiterated, “I am against touching civilians,” though he was strongly supportive of hitting the IDF and other instruments of
the occupation.106
Initially, Brigade members complied with these targeting guidelines. In late 2001,
operatives attacked the IDF in Haifa, Hebron, and Tel Aviv, sparing civilians. By
early 2002, however, the Brigade committed mass casualty attacks on a bat
mitzvah in Hadera, a kibbutz in Menashe, and the Tel Aviv Central Bus Station.107
The reduced targeting selectivity was unmistakable. The National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism observed: “At the outset, [the]
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade expressly targeted Israeli settlers and security forces.
However, the group soon expanded its targets to include citizens in Israeli
cities.”108 The Council on Foreign Relations also noted: “While the group initially
vowed to target only Israeli soldiers and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
in early 2002 it joined … in a spree of terrorist attacks against civilians in Israeli
cities.”109 The US State Department listed the Brigade as a terrorist organization
during this unprecedented wave of indiscriminate bloodshed.
It stemmed from a loss of leadership control. The locus of decision making became
increasingly decentralized in early 2002, as the IDF killed off dozens of Brigade commanders, culminating with the arrest of Barghouti that spring.110 According to Usher,
100. Quoted in Gideon Levy, “Death Isn’t a Big Deal Anymore,” Haaretz (Internet ed.), 8 November
2001.
101. Quoted in ibid.
102. Marwan Barghouti, “Want Security? End the Occupation,” Washington Post, 15 January 2002,
A19.
103. Quoted in Friedman 2008, 46.
104. Quoted in Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, “Arafat Blames Israel for Tel Aviv Bombing,”
Palestinian Media Watch (Internet ed.), 14 July 2004.
105. Quoted in Stuart Tanner, “Battle for the Holy Land: Interviews with Three Palestinian Militant
Leaders,” PBS Frontline, 4 April 2002.
106. Stork 2002, 84.
107. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2003.
108. Ibid.
109. Fletcher 2008.
110. Zelkovitz 2008.
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
333
“Fatah’s resistance went from guerrilla warfare to freelance martyrdom operations
inside Israel” because of “the increasing autonomy of the militias” and resultant “widening gulf between political and military wings.”111 The International Crisis Group
reported that as a result of the decapitation strikes, “the network is diffuse, fragmented, localized, and does not take orders from leaders of the organization.”112 Human
Rights Watch also described the centrifugal effects of the decapitation campaign:
“The military elements responsible for the [terrorist] attacks are not under the
control of the political leadership” because “there is no infrastructure, just small
groups making their own small decisions” with “a [large] degree of autonomy and
improvisation.”113 An Arab-Israeli journalist underscored the growing disconnect
between principal preferences and agent actions: “Most of the military operations
are being carried out by gunmen who don’t report to their political leaders. Even if
the factions had reached an agreement, this wouldn’t have meant a complete end
to the [terrorist] violence.”114 A Palestinian intellectual affirmed the independence
of agent actions, “The decision to resist was taken independently in the [Jenin]
camp, in violation of the leadership’s orders.”115 When asked about the Brigade’s
target selection, even the militants acknowledged that “not all military acts by alAqsa were done with the agreement of the political wing” because “professed identity
with Fatah did not necessarily translate into compliance with Fatah decisions.”116
Although Brigade leaders feared that indiscriminate violence against Israeli civilians would be politically counterproductive, its operatives were driven by alternative
incentives based on their position within the organization. Barghouti opposed
Palestinian attacks on civilians because he had observed over the years how “its
impact on Israeli public opinion was detrimental to us.”117 Arafat too had come to
learn the strategic perils of civilian targeting, warning in the largest Palestinian
daily: “Actions that target civilians are counter to the lofty interests of our nation,
hurt the legality of its legitimate struggle against the occupation, and cause damage
to its image.”118 Other Fatah leaders also seemed to appreciate the costs of attacks
on civilians; Khader, for example, lamented that “they unite the world against
us”119 and al-Sheikh worried that “they have reduced the level of international
support for the Palestinian people.”120 In May 2002, the 130-member Fatah
Revolutionary Council issued a statement condemning “military operations inside
111. Usher 2003, 28, 31, 34.
112. The International Crisis Group 2004, 26.
113. Stork 2002, 63, 82, 84.
114. Quoted in Pearlman 2011, 177.
115. Bishara 2003, 48.
116. Quoted in Stork 2002, 84.
117. Quoted in Nahum Barnea, “We Want to Liberate You,” Yedioth Ahronoth (Internet ed.), 2
September 2001.
118. Quoted in Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, “Arafat Blames Israel for Tel Aviv Bombing,”
Palestinian Media Watch (Internet ed.), 14 July 2004.
119. Quoted in Friedman 2008, 57.
120. Quoted in Chris McGreal, “Arafat Calls off Palestinian Elections,” The Guardian (Internet ed.), 22
December 2002.
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International Organization
Israel … because they are likely to have a negative impact on national resistance.”121
The following month, dozens of Palestinian leaders released an even stronger statement in al Quds: “We call upon the parties behind military operations targeting civilians in Israel to reconsider their policies … these bombings do not contribute toward
achieving our national project … On the contrary, they strengthen the enemies of
peace on the Israeli side.”122 Yet the rank and file was committed to attacking civilians for its own reasons. Operatives perpetrated terrorism so the local community
would look up to them and as a power grab to advance within the organization by
outbidding more restrained rivals.123 The International Crisis Group emphasized
how “above all” lower-level members were motivated by “struggles for power and
position” within the Brigade.124 Other observers pointed to the role of blood
revenge among foot soldiers at the front line. The New York Times, for example, reported that Brigade operatives committed terrorism “often in revenge for Israeli killings” of their loved ones.125 A piece in the New York Review of Books also noted: “In
many cases the bombers say they are taking revenge for the death of someone quite
close to them, a member of their family or a friend.”126 These observations accord
with a seminal demographic study on Palestinian operatives, which finds that
“revenge was their primary motive,” unlike that of the leadership.127
In sum, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade further illustrates how organizational factors
affect the nature of militant group violence. As Sayigh remarks, “Internal dynamics
help explain the often chaotic and counterproductive nature of Palestinian military
activity.”128 This was manifestly the case during the Second Intifada, when
Brigade violence became less selective because of a loss of principal control.
Although the leadership understood the political costs of attacking the Israeli populace, the decapitation campaign empowered lower-level members bent on attracting
esteem within the community, climbing the organizational hierarchy, and avenging
Palestinian suffering to which they were disproportionately exposed.
Conclusion
This study helps to explain the conditions under which militant groups are inclined
toward terrorism against civilians. Our principal-agent framework is based on the
growing consensus that militant groups are internally heterogeneous. Building on
121. “Revolutionary Council and DFLP Call for an End to Attacks Inside Israel,” al-Hayat (Internet ed.),
30 May 2002.
122. Quoted in Allen 2002.
123. See James Bennet, “Transcript of Palestine Lost,” New York Times (Internet ed.), 7 July 2004.
124. International Crisis Group, 2004, i.
125. Quoted in Joel Greenberg, “Mideast Turmoil: Palestinian; Suicide Planner Expresses Joy Over His
Missions,” New York Times (Internet ed.), 9 May 2002.
126. Margalit 2003, 37.
127. Moghadam, 2003, 73.
128. Sayigh 2001, 53.
Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics
335
this insight, we explain how the incentives of members to attack civilians are inversely related to their position within the organization. Our multimethod analysis provides
strong empirical evidence that leadership deficits promote terrorism by empowering
lower-level members with weaker incentives against civilian targeting. Future research may bolster confidence in these findings and unearth new insights on how
the internal dynamics of militant groups influence their tactical choices.
First, researchers might expand the sample of militant groups to probe the generalizability of our theory and identify any scope conditions. Admittedly, most organizations in the analysis are Muslim because the MAROB data set focuses on groups
operating in the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, the lion’s share of drone
strikes has happened in Muslim-majority areas, particularly Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Yemen, as well as in the West Bank. Including more socialist groups such as the
Red Army Faction, Communist Combatant Cells, and Direct Action as well as more
secessionist groups such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Irish Republican Army, and
Chechen separatists would help to determine the broadness of the theory and any
antecedent conditions for it to hold. So, too, would testing the theory on more
groups involved in protracted, full-scale civil wars. In the MAROB data, only a
handful of observations (organization-years) meet this criterion, though other studies
do test alternative theories of civilian targeting in the context of civil wars.129
Second, supplementary case studies would reveal whether detailed evidence of the
causal mechanism is manifest beyond the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. As we have
shown, agency problems within the Brigade can explain variation in its targeting
practices during the Second Intifada. But more cases would help to affirm whether
such dynamics apply across groups and time. Additional cases would also strengthen
our understanding of how militant leaders try to condition foot soldiers into wielding
violence more selectively. The Brigade leadership was highly critical of indiscriminate violence against the Israeli population, but it did not actually punish operatives
for committing it. Leaders of other militant groups in this analysis, such as in the
Taliban, routinely penalize subordinates for attacking the population.130 Prospective
research should explore the different ways in which militant group leaders try to
keep their operatives in check.
Third, additional research should explore how decapitation campaigns affect
militant group violence. Historically, research on targeted killings has assessed the
normative basis.131 More recently, a burgeoning empirical literature has developed
over the strategic utility of decapitation.132 Such research tends to evaluate
129. See, for example, Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 2006; and Weinstein 2007. Partially
overlapping with the broader class of civil wars, secessionist movements may be particularly important
to assess. Fazal, for example, argues that civilian targeting can be explained in part by whether or not militants have secessionist aims. In her view, secessionists are less likely to resort to this tactic owing to their
concerns with not alienating the population they hope to govern or the international community that they
seek to join. See Fazal 2013.
130. See DuPee, Johnson, and Dearing 2009; and Kleponis 2009.
131. See, for example, David 2003.
132. See, for example, Johnston 2012; Jordan 2009; and Price 2012.
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International Organization
whether decapitating the leaders of militant groups reduces their ability to generate
violence. Our analysis departs from this research program by analyzing how the
nature of organization violence changes in the face of decapitation strikes.
Increasingly, Yemen has become a major theater for operations against al-Qaida in
the Arabian Peninsula. As the data become available, future research should test
whether decapitation strikes have the same effect on militant groups as in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the West Bank. Research might also delve into explaining
why strike density has a stronger effect on civilian targeting than the killing of
leaders, whereas the opposite holds true with respect to military targeting.
Fourth, alternative empirical strategies would likely yield new evidence that violence against civilians tends to hail from the rank and file. Anecdotal evidence indicates that when lower-level members split from the leadership, they may exhibit less
restraint toward civilians.133 Further, when members of a militant group attack civilians, the leaders may be less likely to claim credit for the violence.134 Future work
could rigorously test such claims in the context of our principal-agent theory.
Fifth, future research should inspect whether militant groups refrain from terrorism
when strong leaders emerge or whether the tactic leads to an inevitable path of no
return. Our data are ill-suited for answering this question definitively, but our
theory implies that organizations can in fact graduate from this tactic if their leadership becomes stronger. Groups should be able to heal once leadership control is reestablished because then leaders are better equipped to transmit their incentives for
civilian restraint to the rank and file. Our study also has direct implications for conflict resolution in terms of fostering moderate leaders to avert spoilers and other impediments to peace processes.
Finally, it might prove fruitful to assess the conditions under which militant leaders
favor civilian targeting. Based on our analysis, older groups are less likely to attack
civilians even after controlling for organizational structure (Tables 1 and 2). Similar
to bin Laden, other militant leaders may exhibit signs of learning by advocating more
selective violence over time consistent with a rational political actor.135
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